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Regular version of the site

125319, Moscow,
3 Kochnovsky Proezd (near metro station 'Aeroport'). 

Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90 *12332

Email: computerscience@hse.ru



Dean Ivan Arzhantsev

First Deputy Dean Tamara Voznesenskaya

Deputy Dean for Research and International Relations Sergei Obiedkov

Deputy Dean for Methodical and Educational Work Ilya Samonenko

Deputy Dean for Development, Finance and Administration Irina Plisetskaya

Branching rules related to spherical actions on flag varieties
In press

Roman Avdeev, Petukhov A.

Algebras and Representation Theory. 2019.

Minimax theorems for American options without time-consistency

Belomestny D., Kraetschmer V., Hübner T. et al.

Finance and Stochastics. 2019. Vol. 23. P. 209-238.

Cherenkov detectors fast simulation using neural networks

Kazeev N., Derkach D., Ratnikov F. et al.

Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research, Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment. 2019.

Book chapter
Averaging Weights Leads to Wider Optima and Better Generalization

Izmailov P., Garipov T., Подоприхин Д. А. et al.

In bk.: Proceedings of the international conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2018). 2018. P. 876-885.

Colloquium: The Meltdown Attack. Speaker: Guilhem Gamard, HSE

Event ended

April 17, 18:10 – 19:30
Kochnovskii proezd, 3, room 205

Guilhem Gamard

Laboratory of Theoretical Computer Science: Research Fellow

The Meltdown Attack

Modern CPU hardware implement a memory-protection mechanism to prevent one process from reading memory of another process. A few months ago, several vulnerabilities in this mechanism were published; this talk explains one of them, called Meltdown. This attack allows one process to read the whole memory of the machine on which it currently runs. This mostly concerns cloud-computing providers, as virtual machines running on the same physical server can spy each other.

Meltdown received vast coverage because it impacts virtually any Intel CPU currently on the market, and because it has existed for about 20 years before it was discovered. Operating systems vendors have implemented, in software, techniques to mitigate Meltdown; they claim that those security patches induce performance loss in running applications.

In this talk, we will review some features of modern CPUs, then we will explain how to exploit them to bypass memory protection. Finally, we will see how operating systems were modified to mitigate this risk.


Registration is open.